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Abstract  
Minimum wage policy seeks to establish wage floors in order to protect vulnerable workers 
from exploitation and to establish norms to help ensure equal pay for equal work. It may also 
act as a macroeconomic policy tool because of their impact on aggregate demand. The role 
played by minimum wages in Brazil and India is very different due to the contrasting nature, 
coverage, structure and implementation of the systems. While Brazil has an annually adjusted 
unique national minimum wage for all workers with a comparatively high level of 
enforcement; in India, there are large numbers of minimum wages for different occupations, 
varying between States, which makes the system of minimum wages extremely complicated, 
and enforcement is very uneven. In Brazil, minimum wages have a multiplier effect and act as 
a benchmark for other payments such as social security benefits, pensions, etc., while in India; 
minimum wages are not connected to other payments in this way. In Brazil, the minimum 
wage plays a central role in labour market policy and in collective bargaining but in India, it 
receives little political attention. This paper seeks to examine the system of minimum wages 
in both countries and to compare the impact of this policy on labour market inequalities in 
these countries.   
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Minimum Wage Policy in Brazil and India and its Impact on  
Labour Market Inequality 
 
 
This paper is one output of a project on labour market inequality in India and Brazil, being 
carried out by the Institute for Human Development in New Delhi (IHD) and the Brazilian 
Centre for Analysis and Planning in São Paulo (Cebrap), and funded by the Canadian 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC). It does not stand on its own, but should 
be read in conjunction with other papers which examine the growth regimes of the two 
countries and their patterns of inequality. More details and full references to publications may 
be found on the project website, www.ihdindia.org/lmi. This paper was mainly prepared by 
Maria Cristina Cacciamali, Taniya Chakrabarty, Gerry Rodgers and Fabio Tatei, and includes 
contributions from Vidhya Soundararajan, Uma Rani and Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa. 
Cacciamali, Tatei and Barbosa are members of the Cebrap team; Rodgers, Chakrabarty and 
Soundararajan are members of the IHD team; and Rani, a senior researcher at the 
International Labour Organization, is an adviser to the project. We also acknowledge 
comments by other members of the IHD-CEBRAP research team, notably Nandita Gupta and 
Janine Rodgers, as well as comments by participants at a policy dialogue on the topic held in 




An active minimum wage policy, as laid out in Conventions 26 (1928), 99 (1951), and 131 
(1970) of the International Labour Organization, may contribute to several overlapping goals: 
not only the basic goal of setting a floor to wages, but also protecting the more vulnerable 
trades and workers, and reinforcing norms to the effect that equal work receives equal pay. To 
these goals, we should add the impact on aggregate demand of increasing the incomes of low-
paid workers, thus also making the minimum wage into a macroeconomic policy tool.  
 
The implementation of an active minimum wage policy for the purpose of reducing poverty 
and redistributing income is nevertheless always a cause of controversy and heated debates. 
According to standard economic theory, in competitive markets, setting an operative 
minimum wage above market equilibrium leads to excess labour supply relative to demand, 
reducing employment. In the case of a dual market – formal and informal – the consequences 
are particularly negative for the less skilled labour force, precisely those workers who should 
be the main beneficiaries of the policy. According to this view, an increase in the minimum 
wage causes two losses: elimination of good jobs in the organized/formal labour market and 
expansion of the non-organized/informal market that pays less than the minimum wage.  
 
Markets, however, are non-competitive, especially the labour market. In oligopsonist markets, 
the hiring firm has the power to establish a lower wage level than would prevail in a 
competitive market; after all, not all employees will quit the firm to seek better-paying 
vacancies. 
 
Further, we can consider two other theories: the efficiency wage model and Marxist-
structuralist analysis. The former contends that a worker’s effort is a function of the real 
wage; that is, his or her productivity depends on the level of pay. Thus, setting a minimum 
wage above competitive levels would increase labour productivity, prompting companies to 




benchmark for collective bargaining, ultimately aiming to transfer part of the surplus from 
capital to labour, contingent upon the size of the industrial reserve army (Cacciamali, 2005). 
 
The lack of a theoretical consensus makes it necessary to critically analyze empirical studies. 
Up to the 1990s, it was widely believed that there was an inverse correlation between the 
level of the minimum wage and employment (Congress of the United States, 1995; Neumark 
and Waher, 2007; Cebrián et al, 2010). Mincy (1990), for example, argued that an increase in 
the minimum wage leads to unemployment, especially among youths. However, a higher 
minimum wage can also benefit young adult workers, who are an important group among 
low-wage workers and contributors to household income. In addition, as pointed out by Basu, 
Genicot & Stiglitz (1998), a higher minimum wage can lead to a redistribution of labour 
supply among household members, resulting in an increase in the labour force participation of 
adults, especially men, in the place of child and juvenile labour, and increasing the possibility 
for spouses to withdraw from the labour market. 
 
More recently, other studies have emphasized the positive effects of the minimum wage. 
Research by experts such as David Card, Lawrence Katz, and Alan Krueger do not support 
the hypothesis that the increase of the minimum wage in the 1980s in the United States or at 
the beginning of the following decade reduced the level of employment of young workers. 
More recent studies, such as that of the ILO (2008), show that the minimum wage can have a 
positive impact on employment, especially for lower-income and socially vulnerable workers. 
 
This paper considers in particular the contribution of minimum wage policy to the reduction 
of inequality in the labour market, comparing the experiences of India and Brazil. The 
following sections compare the system of minimum wages and the impact of wage-setting 
institutions in the two countries. The role played by minimum wages is quite distinct in the 
two countries due to differences in the nature, coverage, structure and implementation of the 
system. In Brazil, minimum wages have a multiplier effect and act as a benchmark for other 
payments such as social security benefits, pensions and others. In India, on the other hand, 
minimum wages have a more limited effect due to their complicated structure, lack of 
enforcement and poor implementation. The paper then reviews the absolute levels of 
minimum wages and their trends, the extent of coverage and compliance, and the impact on 
employment, poverty and inequality. 
 
 
1. Historical and Institutional Background 
 
In Brazil the minimum wage was established by the 1934 Federal Constitution and regulated 
by Law no. 185 of 14 January 1936, signed by President Getúlio Vargas, who introduced the 
Minimum Wage Commissions. The country was divided into 22 regions and 50 sub-regions, 
with the Commissions in charge of assessing each region’s and sub-region’s living conditions 
and needs, as well as the wages already being paid in each area, with the aim of fixing the 
value of Regional Minimum Wages. Later on Decree-Law No. 399 was signed on 30 April 
1938, establishing that the Minimum Wage of each region and sub-region should be paid to 
an adult worker with no distinction of sex. This value should be “capable of meeting, in a 
given region of the country and at a given time, the normal needs of food, housing, clothing, 
hygiene, and transportation”. On the other hand, the minimum wage was restricted to the 
formal and urban labour market. It therefore had a very limited coverage, although it reached 





In 1940, Decree-Law No. 2,162 established 14 different Minimum Wage tables for each 
specific region and sub-region, to be reviewed after at most three years. However, although 
Minimum Wages were increased twice in 1943, they were then only raised again in 1954, 
decreasing by 65% in real terms, due to rising inflation, over the period 1940-1954.  
 
During the period of the military regime from 1964 to 1985, the government specified the 
annual increase in the minimum wage through a rule that took into account expected inflation 
and productivity gains. Nevertheless, between 1964 and 1978, the "adjustments" 
systematically underestimated these indicators, limiting the growth of the floor wage. The 
effect was a significant increase in wage dispersion and concentration of income; and these 
inequalities rose further in the 1980s due to high rates of inflation. 
 
At present, the Minimum Wage is guaranteed by the 1988 Federal Constitution that in its 
Article 7, refers to the “rights of urban and rural workers, among others that aim to improve 
their social conditions”. Additionally, item IV sets forth a “nationally unified minimum wage, 
established by law, capable of satisfying their basic living needs and those of their families 
[…], it being forbidden to use it as an index for any purpose”. The Minimum Wage legislation 
remains restricted to the formal labour market. 
 
Payment of a wage below the Minimum Wage under a formal employment relationship 
renders the employer liable to punishment with a fine, which is doubled in case of recurrence. 
The oversight procedures for compliance with the Minimum Wage legislation are the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Labour and Employment, which is locally represented by the 
Regional Labour Office (DRT, from the Portuguese Delegacia Regional do Trabalho) in the 
person of the Labour Auditor. Besides direct and autonomous inspection by the auditor, any 
employee can also anonymously report violations to the DRT and/or Labour Justice.  
 
The current rules for setting the Minimum Wage were established by Law No. 12,382, of 25 
February 2011, whereby the Minimum Wage increases at the same rate as the National 
Consumer Price Index (INPC) during the previous 12 months, to which is added the real GDP 
growth 2 years earlier: 
 
Δminwaget = ΔINPCt-1 + ΔGDPt-2,  t=2012, 2013, 2014.  
 
This formula establishes a predictable machinery for the pro-cyclical increase of the 
Minimum Wage, which not only compensates for inflationary losses, but also reflects output 
growth. Prior to becoming law, it had been implemented since 2006. As the formula was valid 
only until 2015, in March of this year its continuation was approved by the Congress for the 
next 4 years. 
 
In addition to its impact on the labour market, the Minimum Wage in Brazil has other direct 
effects since it is the floor for Social Security benefits, including pensions, unemployment 
insurance and some cash-transfer programmes (Bolsa Família not included).  
 
In India, much like the other labour market institutions, wage-fixing institutions also have 
their roots in the colonial period. The Royal Commission on Labour in India, appointed in 
1929, recommended a minimum wage fixing machinery in India. After Independence, the 
Industrial Policy Resolution (1948) was adopted which emphasized the need to fix minimum 
wages in sweated industries and sought to promote fair wage agreements in organized 




and appointed the Committee on Fair Wages to determine the principles on which fair wages 
should be based and how such principles should be applied. 
 
The Committee on Fair Wages defined three distinct levels of wages – living wage,1 fair wage 
and minimum wage. The 'minimum wage' was to ensure not merely the bare sustenance of 
life but the preservation of the efficiency of the worker by providing some measure of 
education, medical requirements and amenities. It envisaged that while the lower limit for the 
"fair wage" must obviously be the minimum wage, the upper limit was set by the capacity of 
the industry to pay (NCL, 1969).  
 
The legal framework is provided by the Minimum Wages Act of 1948, which acts as an over-
arching framework and lays down the minimum levels of wages for all categories of workers 
in the labour market. This law is applicable to both informal and formal sectors so long as the 
industry in which they are engaged is included in the Schedules of the Act. The objective of 
this Act was to ensure a minimum subsistence wage for workers, to prevent sweating or 
exploitation of labour through payment of low wages. The Act gives both the Central and 
State governments the right to fix minimum rates of wages for different employments listed in 
the Act.  
 
The Minimum Wages Act specifies that the minimum wage rate may be fixed in the form of 
time rate, piece rate, guaranteed time rate and overtime rate; and these rates may be fixed by 
the hour, day, month or any other period as prescribed by the authority. The act however does 
not provide any specific criteria for fixing the rates of minimum wages; in the absence of any 
definite criteria, the Indian Labour Conference in 19572 decided on certain norms, which took 
into account the needs of an average family for food, clothing, rent, fuel, lighting and other 
items of expenditure, assuming three consumption units per earner.  
 
The minimum wage so fixed is based on the prevailing poverty line estimates. In a landmark 
judgment in 1992 (Workmen v. Reptakos Breet & Co. Ltd), the Supreme Court declared that 
children’s education; medical requirement; minimum recreation, including festivals and 
ceremonies; provisions for old age and marriage should constitute a further 25 per cent of the 
minimum wage.  
 
Before that, the Bhoothlingam Committee (1978) had proposed the idea of an absolute 
national minimum wage, irrespective of sectors, regions or states below which no 
employment would be permitted. The National Commission on Rural Labour (1991) 
supported the idea and recommended the creation of a non-statutory national floor level 
minimum wage, which was to be revised every year, in order to serve as benchmark below 
which wages should not fall. Following this recommendation, a national minimum wage floor 
was created but it was non-binding in nature and thus it did not provide a definite national 
minimum wage level as the lower limit for all wages.  
 
In addition to the national floor level wages, there are multiple rates of minimum wages fixed 
by the state governments, in accordance to the provisions of the Act, which give rise to a 
system of multiple rates of minimum wages differing across sectors, regions and skill groups. 
1 ‘Living wage' represented a wage level which provided not merely for a bare physical subsistence but for 
maintenance of health, a measure of frugal comfort including education for the children, protection against ill-
health, requirements of essential social needs and some insurance against the more important misfortunes. 





                                           
Moreover, over the years, new sectors have been added to the two Schedules of the Act which 
have further increased the number of minimum wages prevailing in the economy. Belser and 
Rani (2011) report that the central government sets 48 minimum wages for different 
categories including mining, agriculture and oil extraction, or any corporation under its 
ownership. State governments altogether set minimum wages for 1,679 job categories making 
a grand total of about 1,727 different minimum wage rates in India (Rani et al, 2013). 
 
By legal definition, the Minimum Wage Act is applicable to only wage earners engaged in 
paid employment which excludes those engaged in self-employment. Among all wage 
earners, a majority of two-thirds are male and another majority of two thirds live in rural 
areas. The wage-earners in rural areas are mainly casual workers, while a majority of salaried 
workers are found in urban area. 
 
 
2. Minimum Wage Levels and their Evolution over Time 
 
The long term evolution of the real Minimum Wage in Brazil can be observed in Graph 1, 
where we see the downward trend in the real value of the Minimum Wage between 1964 and 
1994, and its sharp recovery, starting in 1994, but especially after 2005. Apart from the 
impact on living conditions, the Minimum Wage setting over the period affected not only the 
labour market functioning, poverty and inequality, but also the main contours of the growth 
regime. During the military regime, a declining minimum wage was one of the reasons why 
economic growth coincided with growing income concentration and social exclusion, whereas 
in the 2000s the minimum wage was an important element in the complementarity between 
growth, income redistribution and social inclusion. 
 






Furthermore, it is important to underscore that the real increase of the minimum wage after 
1995 was greater than the increase in average income and labour productivity, especially in 
the 2000s (Graph 2). This led to a minimum wage whose value became closer to the average 




30% in 1999 (Graph 3). This measure is also known as the simplest version of the Kaitz 
index, which measures the gap between the minimum and the market average wage.3 
 
When we break down by registered and unregistered employees, the same pattern is observed 
for both (graph 3). However, the much higher Kaitz index for unregistered than for registered 
employees, especially in rural areas, reflects the much lower wages in the informal labour 
market, which are therefore closer to the minimum wage. Thus, the indices are not directly 
comparable between groups, and what must be analyzed is their evolution within groups over 
time. 
 
Graph 2: Ratio of Labour Income and Minimum Wage to Labour Productivity. Moving 
average for one year, Brazil, 1996 to 2013 
 
Source: IBGE/SCN 2000 quarterly data and IBGE/PME 
 
 
3 The complete Kaitz index is the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage multiplied by the percent of 




                                           
Graph 3: Ratio of Minimum to Average Wages (simplified Kaitz index), Brazil, 1999-
2013. 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on PNAD microdata. 
 
 
In India, different rates in different regions for different categories of workers have made the 
structure of the minimum wage very complex, and it is difficult to provide a simple picture 
over time like that for Brazil. However, as noted above a non-binding national minimum 
wage floor has existed since the 1990s (table 1). It can be seen that this minimum wage rose 
in real terms between 2002 and 2004, but otherwise has shown very little change. 
 
Table 1: National Minimum Wage Floor, India, 1996-2013 
 Minimum Wages per 
day (in current Rs) 




1996 35 74 47 
1998 40 89 45 
2000 45 96 47 
2002 50 104 48 
2004 66 112 59 
2007 80 133 60 
2010 100 180 56 
2011 115 195 59 
2013 137 236 58 
Source: Report on the Working of Minimum Wages Act 1948, various years 
* Average for the financial year (e.g. figure for 1996 corresponds to April 1996 to March 1997) 
 
 
There is a great diversity of minimum wages across states (table 2) – for some occupations, 
minimum wages are twice as high in Kerala as in Bihar – but differential levels of economic 
development across states do not appear to be the most important factors. The comparatively 




wages across sectors. For many of the states, we find that there has been some degree of 
convergence where the minimum wages fixed are the same across sectors, as is seen for 
Punjab, Delhi and to some extent in Bihar but this also gives rise to questions as to the 
authenticity of the data provided in the reports by the respective state governments.  
 
State-level minimum wages are expected to be adjusted for inflation over time; however, this 
is not always the case. The Act specifies that wages be revised every five years; in reality, in 
certain sectors, these rates often remain unrevised for long periods. This has been possible 
because of a clause in the Act that says that if wages are not revised by states, then the 
existing wages should continue – the government has used this to evade responsibilities of 
regular revision and proper implementation. Representatives from business organizations 
argue that the fixation of state-level minimum wages is frequently a political issue as 
governments have often provided a whopping increase in minimum wages, without any 
definite criterion, prior to elections in order to get the support of workers and unions. 
Whatever the factors involved, there has in most states and sectors been a rise in the minimum 
wage in real terms over the 15 year period reported in table 2 (the increase in prices over this 
period was 2.65 times for industrial workers, while most of the increases in minimum wages 
fell between 3 and 4 times).  
 
Because of the complexity of the minimum wage system, it is difficult to compute a Kaitz 
index like that for Brazil. However, table 3 tries to provide a similar comparison for the last 
two decades. The table takes the lowest and highest minimum wages in each state (from the 
range of state-wise wages as provided in the various Reports on the Working of the Minimum 
Wages Act, 1948), and gives the national average across states; and compares this with the 
mean observed wages for casual and regular workers as estimated in the NSSO reports. Since 
the national averages for minimum wages are based on the reports filed by each state, the 
figures are not available for same years as the NSS estimates; therefore, the nearest years have 
been taken into consideration. Among the various categories of workers, casual workers in 
rural areas receive the lowest wages and regular workers in urban areas receive the highest 
wages; so these categories are considered to give a range, which can be compared with the 
lowest and highest wages set by the minimum wage regulation.  
 
If we first compare the lowest minimum wages with observed casual rural wages, the pattern 
is remarkably stable over time. In 1991-93 the lowest minimum wage was about the same as 
the casual rural wage. The minimum rose faster than the average until 2004-05; but then the 
rise in market wages accelerated, so that the average wages exceeded the prescribed minimum 
by 2011; but the difference was less than 10 per cent. 
 
Comparing regular urban wages with the highest minimum wage, we see that the market 
wage was generally much higher than the prescribed minimum – 2.3 times in 1993, falling to 
1.7 in 2004-05 before recovering to 2.0 in 2011-12. The pattern over time was similar to that 





Table 2: Minimum Wages in Selected Sectors and States, India, 1998-2013 (in current 
rupees) 








1998 39 40 68 40 66 32 49 51 75 
2005 66 50 96 72 94 * 58 67 122 
2011 120 160 179 150 160 100 100 167 247 
2013 170 120 205 150 250 100 142 173 311 
Automobile 
1998 51 63 67 N.A. 63 57 75 N.A. 75 
2005 68 87 91 N.A. 90 * 95 N.A. 122 
2011 125 173 179 N.A. 154 183 166 N.A. 247 
2013 176 213 205 N.A. 240 248 200 N.A. 311 
Brick Kiln Industry 
1998 51 63 N.A. 80 63 42 52 64 75 
2005 68 89 N.A. 154 90 * 67 99 122 
2011 125 160 N.A. 262 154 123 166 134 247 
2013 176 200 205 304 240 188 200 149 311 
Construction of Buildings and Roads 
1998 51 65 67 75 63 67 71 56 75 
2005 68 90 90 162 90 * 92 90 122 
2011 125 176 179 308 154 194 166 195 247 
2013 176 217 205 368 240 262 200 205 311 
Stone Breaking and Crushing 
1998 51 63 67 65 63 N.A. 71 58 75 
2005 68 87 91 162 90 N.A. 92 64 122 
2011 125 173 179 308 154 N.A. 166 195 247 
2013 176 213 205 368 240 N.A. 200 205 311 
Oil Mills 
1998 51 66 67 113 63 41 73 75 75 
2005 68 91 91 136 90 * 92 100 122 
2011 125 177 179 212 154 141 166 195 247 
2013 176 217 205 250 240 192 200 205 311 
Public Motor Transport 
1998 51 69 67 N.A. 63 74 73 80 75 
2005 68 94 91 N.A. 90 * 95 120 122 
2011 125 182 179 N.A. 154 230 166 196 247 
2013 176 222 205 N.A. 240 358 200 207 311 
Note: N.A. denotes Non availability of data. *Tamil Nadu did not file reports in 2005 







Table 3: Comparison of Minimum Wages with Actual Wages, India, 1991-2011, in 
current rupees 
National Average of state 
Minimum Wages 
Actual (Mean) Wages Paid 




1991 21 33 1993 21 76 
1999 44 75 1999-00 40 165 
2004 69 112 2004-05 49 194 
2011 129 221 2011-12 139 450 
Source: Minimum Wages are obtained from various reports on the Working of the Minimum Wages Act, MoL&E, 




Interestingly, the simple Kaitz ratios for both rural casual and urban regular workers in India 
in 2011-12 – 0.93 for the former and 0.49 for the latter – were quite close to those for rural 
unregistered and urban registered workers in Brazil in 2013 (1.08 and 0.43). But this trend 
was different in the two countries, for the ratio had been rising sharply in Brazil while it was 
broadly constant in India. 
 
Figures in table 3 are given in current prices. In constant prices, between 2004-05 and 2011-
12, the average wage rose by 64% for rural casual workers and 34% for urban regular 
workers, but the minimum rose by only 8% for the lowest minimum wages and by 14% for 
the highest. This small increase in minimum wages at a time of rapid GDP growth is 
surprising, and suggests that minimum wages have played little role in the overall increase of 
wages in the last decade; this is completely opposite to the situation in Brazil. The complexity 
of the minimum wage system in India, with its multiple rates of minimum wages, is one of the 
reasons, but the failure to increase minimum wages after 2004 was mainly a political decision.  
 
Finally, for the comparison of the minimum wage levels between Brazil and India, graphs 4 
and 5 show their values in PPP dollars (2011 dollars). In Brazil the minimum wage rose from 
PPP$ 236 in 1996 to PPP$ 408 in 2013, an increase of 73%, which is significantly lower than 
the growth of 113% of the real minimum wage in local currency. In India, the national 
minimum wage in 2011 PPP$ also rose from 1996 to 2013, rather less sharply, though a little 
more than in real rupee terms.  
 
In India, the minimum wage is set at a daily rate. For comparison with Brazil, we convert this 
to a monthly rate on the assumption of 25 days work per month (but also see the annex, which 
discusses assumptions about weekly working days). On this basis the minimum wage in 2013, 
at just under PPP$200, can be compared with the minimum wage in Brazil in the same year of 
just over PPP$400, and the ratio of the minimum wage in PPP dollars between these countries 





Graph 4: National Minimum Wage, Brazil, 1996-2013 (in 2011 PPP US$ per month) 
 
Source: IPEA and World Bank for PPP$ series. 
 
 
Graph 5: National Minimum Wage, India, 1996-2013, in 2011 PPP US$  
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3. Coverage and Compliance 
 
3.1 Legal Coverage 
 
In order to analyze the extent of coverage of and compliance with minimum wages, we must 
first identify the legal coverage of minimum wages in both countries, in accordance to the 
provisions of their respective minimum wage legislations. The system of minimum wages in 
Brazil, as mentioned earlier, is applicable to all wage workers, both formal and informal, 
through direct or indirect means. In contrast, minimum wages in India are applicable to 




under the Schedules of the Act; hence unlike Brazil, not all workers in India are legally 
covered by the minimum wages.  
 
Table 4: Proportion of Wage Workers Covered by Minimum Wage Legislation, Brazil 
and India, 2004-05 and 2009-10 
  
2004-05 2009-10 
Brazil India Brazil India 
Overall  100 60.8 100 70.7 
Region Rural  100 43.7 100 76.1 
 Urban 100 46.9 100 58 
Sex Male  100 59.5 100 65.3 
 Female 100 63.8 100 85.6 
Industry Agriculture 100 80.7 100 93.4 
 Mining  100 58.6 100 68.7 
 Manufacturing 100 44 100 48.7 
 Construction 100 15.5 100 30.5 
Skill Low Skill Services  100 36.3 100 66.5 
 
High Skill 
Services  100 75.8 100 68.6 
Sector Formal 100 57.4 100 65.7 
 Informal 100 62.4 100 73.1 
Source: Rani, Uma, et al (2013) 
 
 
Nevertheless, the formal 100 per cent coverage in Brazil is somewhat misleading. Legally, the 
Minimum Wage legislation covers any wage worker; however unregistered workers (in the 
informal labour market) may be receiving below the minimum wage. If they appeal to the 
Labour Court they will receive their due relating to the minimum wage as well as all other 
labor rights. But in reality, the Minimum Wage legislation only covers registered employees 
(the formal sector) because employers cannot register an employee paid below the minimum. 
 
The rates of legal coverage in India differ across sectors, skill groups, region, sex, and 
industry. Over the years, there has been a rise in the legal coverage because both the central 
and state governments have made additions to the list of sectors included in the Schedules of 
the Act; but there still remains significant proportion of unorganized sector workers who are 
not eligible for coverage. For these groups, it was hoped that the minimum wage legislation 
would help in creating a norm for setting unorganized sector wages; but it does not appear 
that this occurred. On the contrary, large numbers of workers legally covered under the Act 






3.2 Overall Compliance  
 
The major problem faced by the minimum wage policy in both countries is the high incidence 
of non-compliance where legally covered workers are paid wages less than the minimum 
levels. The presence of a large informal sector with limited minimum wage coverage and 
limited unionization make the issue of non-compliance a bigger problem for India than for 
Brazil. 
 
Rani et al (2013) have compared the rates of minimum wage coverage and compliance across 
various developing countries, including India and Brazil. This study provides us with the 
actual rates of minimum wage compliance across different indicators over a period of time. 
These figures can then be compared with the legal coverage of the Act (as provided in the 
above table) to analyse the proportion of workers who should be paid minimum wages but do 
not in fact receive them. 
 
Graph 6: Actual Compliance (%) with Minimum Wages in India (2004-05 and 2011-12) 

















Source: NSS (India); table 5 below (Brazil). Based on Rani, Uma, et al (2013), "Minimum wage coverage and 
compliance in developing countries", International Labour Review, Vol. 152, No. 3-4, pp. 381-410. 
 
 
Graph 6 shows the overall rate of compliance in both countries for the years 2004-05 and 
2011-12 in India, and 1999 and 2013 for Brazil. While the overall rates of compliance have 
increased in India since 2004-05, a large proportion of workers continue to be paid sub-
minimal wages. In addition, as we will see below, the improvement in compliance reflects a 
rapid increase in average wages but little change in minimum wages, rather than an increase 
in the effectiveness of the law. Brazil on the other hand, has maintained higher rates of 
compliance. There is only a slight fall from 1999 to 2013, despite a rapid increase in the 
absolute level of the minimum wage. 
 
More precise figures for Brazil are given in table 5. In 2013, out of 91 million workers, 9.5 
million earned exactly the minimum wage and 14.5 million less than the minimum. The share 




and 2013.4 The table also shows an increase in the proportion receiving less than the 
minimum wage between 1999 and 2009, which is consistent with graph 6, but the downward 
trend may be a better indication of what is happening in the long term. 
 
Table 5: Occupied Workers by Minimum Wage Class, Brazil, 1989-2013* 
 Less than 1 m.w. 1 m.w. 
More than 1 
m.w Total 
Occupied population (thousands) 
1989 13,236 3,549 38,598 55,383 
1999 10,610 4,180 45,734 70,787 
2009 17,609 9,445 54,159 88,947 
2013 14,581 9,476 61,318 91,626 
Percentage distribution (excludes workers with no income) 
1989 23.9 6.4 69.7 100.0 
1999 15.0 5.9 64.6 100.0 
2009 19.8 10.6 60.9 100.0 
2013 15.9 10.3 66.9 100.0 
Notes: * In 1989 information was unavailable on employed workers with no income. Excluding rural Northern 
region residents, except Tocantins State.  
Occupied population = total labour force occupied; total economically population occupied. 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on PNAD microdata for selected years. 
 
 
3.3 Compliance by Employment Status 
 
The overall rates of compliance can be further disaggregated in order to compare compliance 
by employment status, region, gender and social group.  
 
Mirroring the formalization process the Brazilian labour market underwent in the 2000s, the 
minimum wage became more important for non-registered workers (informal workers). While 
the proportion of non-registered wage workers receiving from one to two minimum wages 
increased between 1999 and 2013, the proportion below the floor also increased. In 2013, 
35% of unregistered wage earners earned below the minimum wage, and 44% of domestic 
workers receive a wage below the floor (graph 7). However, the most important aspect is that 
wages below the minimum were practically absent (1%) among the formal workers, the group 
pioneering the creation of new jobs in the 2000s, confirming effective enforcement of the 
law.5 On the other hand, the influence of the minimum wage in Brazil goes beyond the formal 
sector and serves as a reference throughout the economy, especially for wage workers without 
a formal job contract (unregistered wage workers). Those spillover effects to the informal or 
uncovered sector are the so-called “lighthouse effects” discussed in the literature. 
4 The PNAD only started to collect information on employed workers with no income with the methodological 
changes introduced in 1992. Thus, these workers were excluded from the analysis to ensure comparability with 
1989 data. 
5 There are two hypotheses to explain why there is a percentage of registered employees earning below the 
minimum wage. The first is that they are part-time employees, i.e. working less than 220 hours per month, the 
legal monthly working hours in Brazil as established by the Constitution. The second hypothesis is that these are 





                                           
Graph 7: Occupied Workers by Minimum Wage Class and Employment Status, Brazil, 
2013 (in %) 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on PNAD microdata. 
 
 
In India, graph 8 shows that almost 48% of all casual workers and approximately 22% of all 
regular workers received sub-minimal wages in 2004-05. There was some improvement in the 
payment of minimum wages for casual workers from 2004-05 to 2011-12, which can be 
traced mainly to the fact (which we noted above) that average wages rose faster than the 
minimum wage during this period. Nevertheless, the broad patterns remained the same, and 
the proportion below minimum wages was almost unchanged for regular workers.  
 
The pattern by employment status is partly, but not entirely a question of the difference 
between organized and unorganized sectors. It should be noted that with the expansion of 
contract employment, there are large numbers of informal workers within the organized sector 
who are engaged in low skilled, manual jobs and are vulnerable to less-than-minimum wage 
payments despite being a part of the organized sector. Interestingly, there seems to be a 
hierarchy of wages even within the organized sector, with wage differences within similar 
categories of workers employed in factories of different sizes. Further, within the public 
sector, workers engaged in certain government schemes like ASHA and Anganwadi are not 
recognized as workers; they are called helpers and are not eligible for minimum wages. In 
case of regular workers, those engaged in agriculture or working for small scale enterprises 
are more likely to receive sub-minimum wages while traditional service sector workers are 
generally paid very low wages irrespective of whether they are regular or casual workers. This 
greater complexity of the Indian labour market, compared with the Brazilian, is in part 
because of the importance of informal institutions. 
 
Greater unionization helps production workers in securing at least basic minimum wages, as 
compared to non-unionized workers in tiny enterprises; if there is a union at the workplace 
only 20% of casual workers received less than the minimum wage in 2011-12, against 41% 
where there is no union. There was a similar pattern for regular workers. Thus, workers 




minimal wages. Despite the theoretical coverage provided by the Minimum Wage Act, there 
are no effective mechanisms for fixing wages for the unorganized sector. Employers in the 
unorganized sector often use minimum wages as the upper limit for setting wages and as a 
result, wages of informal workers are often less than the minimum wage stipulations.  
 
Graph 8: Percent of Workers Receiving Wages below State Level Minimum Wages. 
India, 2004-05 and 2011-12, by employment status  
 
Source: Calculated from NSSO unit level data of 2004-05 and 2011-12 
 
 
3.4 Other Dimensions of Minimum Wage Compliance: Region, Gender and Social 
Group 
 
Unlike in India, in Brazil the minimum wage is set for the whole nation, but enforcement in 
each region depends on the dynamism of its economic activity, labour market organization 
and the active role of trade unions. In the poorest region in Brazil, the Northeast, some 36% of 
workers earn below the minimum wage, while in the wealthier Southeast, South, and Center-





Graph 9: Occupied Workers by Minimum Wage Class and Region, Brazil, 2013 (in %) 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on PNAD microdata. 
 
 
The same happens in India, but in a different extent. Table 6 suggests that in poorer states like 
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, a very high proportion of casual workers do not 
receive minimum wages. Even in highly industrialized states like Gujarat, Haryana and 
Maharashtra, a large proportion of casual workers get less than the minimum wage levels 
announced by the respective states. In the states in southern India, on the other hand, casual 
labourers are more likely to receive minimum wages. In general, the implementation is better 




Table 6: Percentage Share of Casual Workers not getting Minimum Wages in Major 
States, India, 2009–10 
States 
Rural Urban 
Farm Non-Farm Non-Farm 
Andhra Pradesh 93 25 36 
Assam  71 57 70 
Bihar  70 57 56 
Chhattisgarh 87 47 74 
Gujarat  89 43 77 
Haryana 57 26 62 
Himachal Pradesh 23 5 28 
Jammu & Kashmir 22 8 26 
Jharkhand 74 35 80 
Karnataka 94 27 58 
Kerala 97 18 18 
Madhya Pradesh 89 67 86 
Maharashtra  91 48 65 
Odisha 76 55 39 
Punjab  44 19 47 
Rajasthan 64 20 67 
Tamil Nadu 99 34 39 
Uttar Pradesh 66 33 23 
Uttarakhand 54 11 39 
West Bengal  73 61 56 
India  73 37 54 
Source: Labour Bureau Data, MoL&E, 2010 and NSS Employment Survey 2009-10. 
 
 
Graphs 10 and 11 give the pattern of compliance with minimum wages (percentage not 
receiving minimum wages) by gender, rural-urban and employment status. The minimum 
wage is better respected in urban areas in both Brazil and India, although for female casual 
workers in India there is not much difference. A high proportion of rural workers in both 
countries earn less than one minimum wage, both male and female, with women in rural India 
doing relatively worse. In general, the gender gap is larger in India than in Brazil, with much 
higher proportions of women than of men getting less than minimum wages, whether rural or 
urban, casual or regular. In Brazil, in 2013 19 per cent of women earned less than one 
minimum wage in urban areas, as compared to 10% of men, with the differences concentrated 





Graph 10: Percentage Share of Workers not getting Minimum Wages, by Rural-Urban 
Area, Registered or Unregistered and Sex, Brazil, 1999 and 2013 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on PNAD microdata. 
 
 
Graph 11: Percentage Share of Workers not getting Minimum Wages, by Rural-Urban 





On the other hand, the distribution by race (skin colour) in Brazil (graph 12) reveals not only 
that non-whites are the majority among workers earning less than one minimum wage, but 
also that the percentage of non-whites (13.9%) who earn exactly the minimum wage is also 
higher than that of whites. In the recent period, there was a decrease in the proportion of non-
white workers below one minimum wage, although this percentage is still twice as high as 





Graph 12: Occupied Workers by Minimum Wage Class and Race, Brazil, 1989-2013 (%) 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on PNAD microdata. 
 
 
In India, Table 7 shows that 30 to 40% of casual workers were paid less than the minimum 
wages in 2011-12 irrespective of caste or religion, except the Scheduled Tribes, who are 
worse off. Among regular workers, upper caste Hindus to do clearly better than other groups, 
less than 15% below minimum wages compared with 20 to 33% for other group, followed by 
other religions and Hindu OBCs; and again, Scheduled Tribes do worst, closely followed by 
Scheduled Castes and Muslim OBCs.  Due to the policy of reservations, salaried workers 
belonging to the SC community may earn minimum wages because of formal sector 
employment in the lower cadres (grade IV) of government jobs; but the policy of reservations 
does not extend to the private sector, and it is clearly not enough to offset a tendency for SC 
workers to have a higher probability of earning less than minimum wages. There is no clear 
pattern of change over time, and it is interesting to note that the pattern for casual work is 
quite different from that for regular work. 
 
Table 7: Percentage of Workers Receiving Wages below State Level Minimum Wages, 
by Social Group, India, 2004-05 and 2011-12 
  Casual workers Regular workers 
  2004-05 2011-12 2004-05 2011-12 
Hindu ST 60.4 56.9 28.4 33.2 
Hindu SC 47.1 36.8 30.1 29.7 
Hindu OBC 45.5 38.1 25.8 22.1 
Hindu upper caste 45.5 38.6 13.2 14.6 
Muslim OBC 37.8 31.8 32.6 30.2 
Muslim non OBC 40.9 35.2 19.6 26.5 
other religion 48.7 25.9 23.5 22.2 






Overall, it can be see that in Brazil, after rising in real terms in the past decade, the minimum 
wage has become the baseline remuneration for the less skilled sectors of the workforce 
and/or of those economic sectors with lower productivity rates. This is clear from the 
decreasing trend (17.1% in 2013) in the percentage of workers who earn less than one 
minimum wage, mostly distributed among unregistered wage workers, domestic workers and 
self-employed, the latter not really directly affected by the minimum wage, at least if they are 
not disguised wage workers. In India the data indicate that the distinction between regular and 
casual workers in rural and urban areas is more strongly associated with payment of minimum 
wages than differences across region, gender, caste or religion; nevertheless, the main 
difference compared to Brazil is not the coverage, but the enforcement of minimum wage. 
 
Of course, in order to interpret these patterns one must also take into account the level of 
minimum wages in relation to the average wages prevailing in the market. As we saw in 
section 2, for casual/unregistered work, and for regular/registered work, this ratio is now 
broadly similar in the two countries. However, in Brazil, this is the outcome of a steady 
increase in minimum wages, which in turn has facilitated its role as an effective instrument of 
labour market policy; in sharp contrast, in India, minimum wages have fallen behind the 
increase in the average wages prevailing in the market.   
 
 
4. What We Learn from the Experience of India and Brazil 
 
4.1 Enforcement and Implementation of Minimum Wages  
 
Effective implementation of the Minimum Wages Act in India is greatly dependent on the 
nature and extent of inspections carried out under the Act. The Act puts great importance on 
the process of periodic inspections by the labour inspectors, appointed by the appropriate 
government, but recent evidence suggests that there has been a very low level of inspection 
and enforcement. Further, the informal or unorganized sector, which is much bigger in India 
than in Brazil, largely remains outside the reach of labour inspection.  
 
Data on the enforcement of this Act can be obtained from the Reports on the Working of the 
Minimum Wages Act, published yearly by the Indian Government, which indicates the number 
of inspectors assigned at the state level for each year. The average number of inspectors is 
reported as declining from 187 in 2003-04 to 183 in 2011-12. The Report on the Working of 
the Minimum Wages Act (1948) for the year 2013 states that the highest numbers of 
inspectors was found in the state of Tamil Nadu followed by Jharkhand. However, these 
figures are not useful for making a realistic accurate assessment of the level of enforcement in 
each state; indeed, this is a general problem with the statistics on enforcement of labour 
regulations in India.  
 
Apart from inspection, the lack of awareness among workers about the provisions and 
entitlements listed under the Act is an additional factor that has increased their vulnerability. 
A recent evaluation study on the implementation of the Minimum Wages Act in the stone-
breaking and stone-crushing industry in Karnataka in 2007-08 found that only 30% of 
employers were aware of this Act and only 27% of them paid the prescribed wages to their 
workers. Among the workers, only 8.4% were aware of this Act and only 18.5% knew of any 





Minimum wages are expected to be a floor level below which wages should not fall; but many 
employers pay workers – especially casual, contract and home-based workers – wages far 
below the minimum wage level. For the unorganized sector, this Act is the principal labour 
legislation applicable; but ineffective implementation and non-compliance by employers, 
coupled with low unionization, have made workers in this sector more susceptible to 
exploitation. Not only are these workers denied minimum wages, they are also denied 
overtime payments, leave and other entitlements specified under the Act. The imbalance of 
unionization between organized and unorganized sectors, and across different types of 
economic activity, has no doubt accentuated the wage differentials between different 
categories of workers. 
 
Brazil, on the other hand, is credited with having successfully combined a rising level of 
minimum wages with an increase in the level of compliance. This has been possible due to 
three factors that are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.  
 
First, Brazil, unlike India, has a simple national minimum wage system that is easier to 
administer and monitor. We must note that the Ministry of Labour improved the control of 
informality in the 2000s, especially through the increasing use of virtual monitoring 
instruments integrated with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Social Security. In 
addition, there have been other efforts, such as valorizing the profession of inspector, 
increasing wages, hiring more qualified personnel and intensifying their training in these new 
instruments. The National Plan to Combat Informality (Plano Nacional de Combate à 
Informalidade dos Trabalhadores Empregados - PNCITE) established in 2014 integrated and 
institutionalized all these measures.  
 
Second, the enforcement of the minimum wage in Brazil is also favoured by the active role 
played by the Labour Justice system, which reviews complaints filed against noncompliance 
of rules set forth in the labour code, imposing fines on noncompliant employers and the 
payment of compensation to workers. 
 
Third, trade unions in Brazil have become stronger over time, in sharp contrast to India where 
they have lost their bargaining power. In Brazil, payroll taxes finance unions, which thus have 
regular inflows of resources for their expansion and organization. Furthermore, there is a 
major political factor in the recent union performance. The Workers' Party (Partido dos 
Trabalhadores - PT) has been in charge of the federal government and of important states and 
municipalities since 2003. In parallel, union leaders have played important roles in public 
administration and in shaping public opinion increasing the influence of unions on decisions 
relating to social and labour rights. 
 
These actions contributed to the high level of enforcement of minimum wage in the formal 
sector; and can inspire similar actions in other countries, including India. However, the 
implementation of these actions is expensive, so the political, economic and social 
environment cannot be disregarded. 
 
 
4.2 Impacts of Minimum Wages 
 
4.2.1 Impact on Employment 
 
The common belief in standard neoclassical economics is that a rise in minimum wages 




means a consensus on this belief. A recent ILO publication (ILO, 2008) has pointed out that if 
set at a reasonable level, minimum wages “can increase the number of workers with access to 
decent wages and reduce the gender pay gap with little or no adverse impact on employment 
levels”.  
 
In Brazil, the impact of the minimum wage on the employment level in metropolitan areas 
from 2002 to 2012 was estimated using the methodology of Cebrián, Pitarch, Rodríguez, and 
Toharia (2010).6 The relationship tended to be negative, findings that corroborate previous 
estimates by, among others, Foguel (1998); Foguel, Ramos, and Carneiro (2001); Lemos 
(2002; 2003; 2004); and Soares (2002). 
 
More specifically, the estimates show that increases in the minimum wage in Brazil in the 
2000s tended to negatively affect labour market entry for the more vulnerable social groups, 
in this case, young women aged 15 to 19 (Table 8). Women are more negatively affected by 
the impact of the minimum wage on employment, such that a 1 per cent increase in the Kaitz 
index, ceteris paribus, prompts a decrease of -0.063% in women’s employment, compared 
with a decrease of -0.025% for men. This pattern repeats itself in every age group, but is more 
significant for women aged 15 to 19, for whom a 1 percentage increase in the Kaitz index 
causes their employment rate to fall by -0.35%; while for men the impact is only significant 
among adults. 
 
The estimates for the whole sample and, particularly for the women’s sample, show the 
situation is most pressing for young workers. This finding is not surprising because they are 
the age group that, in general, is the lesser skilled professionally and has the lowest 
credentials in face of adults. Consequently, these young workers are employed in lower skill 
jobs whose income is strongly associated with the minimum wage. On the other hand, the 
estimates for the work force as a whole are small. 
 
It can be inferred that employers of jobs that are sensitive to minimum wage variations give 
preference to male adults, who, in their view, are considered more productive than women 
and young workers. We stress, however, that these findings do not imply that the minimum 
wage has led to a reduction in the level of employment in Brazil for the groups mentioned 
above, but just that employment growth was relatively smaller. 
 
Table 8: Estimate of Kaitz Index Effects on Rate of Employment by Sex and Age 
Group, Brazil, 2002-2012 
  Total  Male  Female 
  Coef. Sig.  Coef. Sig.  Coef. Sig. 
Total -0.037 **  -0.025 *  -0.063 ** 
15 to 19 years -0.224 **  -0.089   -0.355 *** 
20 to 24 years -0.057   -0.019   -0.101 ** 
25 to 54 years -0.033 **   -0.025 **   -0.068 ** 
Note: (***) significant at 1%; (**) significant at 5%; and (*) significant at 10%. 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on PME microdata. 
 
 
6 The model’s dependent variable is the employment rate, obtained as ratio of the number of occupied workers to 
the total active age population; and the impact stemming from the minimum wage rise is observed through the 





                                           
In India, there has been relatively little research into the possible effect of minimum wages on 
employment. There is a widespread assumption that the slow growth of employment in the 
organized sector is due to overregulation, with minimum wages one of the elements, but in 
reality there is not much evidence to support this. Employers often argue that a rise in the 
level of minimum wages would exceed their capacity to pay which will in turn force them to 
reduce their employment levels. In practice, however, what occurs is not a reduction in 
employment but an informalization or contractualization by which regulation can be 
bypassed. In this case minimum wages might reinforce labour market segmentation without 
having much impact on overall levels of employment. It is generally believed that a change in 
employment levels due to alterations in the minimum wages is more likely to occur in the 
form of adjustments in the number of work days, especially for casual workers, than in 
absolute levels of employment. Open unemployment is unlikely because the displaced wage 
workers would then shift to self-employment instead of remaining unemployed.  
So there are certainly implications for employment patterns of minimum wages. But low 
levels of enforcement suggest that this will be at most a secondary effect. This conclusion is 
supported by a study of various developing countries by Rani, Belser and Rajbar (2013), 
which found that the impact on employment of minimum wages in India in the period 2005 to 
2010 was statistically insignificant. 
 
4.2.2 Impact on Poverty 
 
The potential impact of minimum wages on the level of poverty is greatly dependent on how 
high the minimum wage is in relation to the poverty line and on the level of enforcement in 
each country.  Nevertheless, even set at a relatively low level, and despite poor enforcement, 
minimum wages could play a significant role as a policy instrument to reduce poverty in India 
since a large share of the workforce live in poverty.  
 
The relationship between the minimum wage and household poverty depends of course on 
household size and the number of workers. When the minimum wage is specified on a daily 
basis, it also depends on the number of days worked. An annex to this paper presents some 
data for 2011-12 in India, using the National Floor Wage of Rs 115 per day at that time as the 
reference point, and the official estimates of poverty of the Planning Commission.  The 
conclusion is that in urban areas, the minimum wage provides an income below the poverty 
line whatever the assumptions about household size and days of work. In rural areas it 
provides an income above the poverty line only under assumptions of very high levels of 
employment. The best estimate, for a typical household of five persons with 1.5 wage earners, 
is that the minimum wage gives an income which is 15 per cent below the poverty line in 
rural areas, and 31 per cent below in urban areas.  
 
In Brazil we have adopted the line of poverty set by Rocha (1997), who considers poverty as 
income insufficiency on the basis of information on the ‘food basket’ and the non-household 
consumption structure across regions. To illustrate, the lowest poverty line is in rural North, 
equivalent to 15.6% of the minimum wage in 2013 (R$ 678 or PPP US$ 302.5); while the 
highest poverty line is in the metropolitan area of São Paulo, equal to 58.7% of the minimum 
wage.  
 
Belser and Rani (2011) in their analysis of 2004-05 NSS data have shown that approximately 
30% of regular workers and 40% of casual workers who earn below minimum wages belong 
to poor families in India and that among the poor wage-earning population approximately 




workforce, the probability of being poor increases by between 9 and 10 percentage points, 
compared to otherwise similar workers, if wages are below minimum wage levels. This 
reflects the results of a multivariate analysis holding constant sex, caste, education, industry, 
occupation and enterprise size. Similarly, for casual workers, not receiving minimum wages 
raises the probability of being poor by 7 to 8 percentage points. Therefore, if workers are paid 
minimum wages, the probability of being poor is substantially reduced. They however add 
that if the number of working days were reduced, as a result of the enforcement of minimum 
wages, then the beneficial effects of minimum wages on poverty would also be reduced.  
 
These results probably understate the contribution of minimum wages to the reduction of 
poverty, because some of the other factors in the equation, such as caste and industry, are 
themselves significantly related to the likelihood that minimum wages would be paid. 
However, as in the case of inequality (which we discuss in the next section), it is likely that 
these effects will have been smaller in 2011-12 than in 2004-05.  
 
In Brazil, the impact of minimum wage on poverty using Belser and Rani’s (2011) 
methodology shows that individuals earning lower than minimum wage labour income have a 
15.6% probability of belonging to households below the poverty line, while this probability is 
only 2.1% for workers who earn at least one minimum wage. Therefore, workers who earned 
income that is equal to or higher than the minimum wage, ceteris paribus, would have a 
reduction of 13.4 percentage points in the probability of being poor. 
 
In recent years in Brazil, particularly since the mid-2000s, the increase in formal employment 
and in the real value of the minimum wage at rates higher than average income has changed 
the relative importance of the minimum wage. The minimum wage was equivalent to 23% of 
the average income in 1995, while this percentage increased to 43.7% in 2013.7 This 
relationship is even more significant if we consider the 20% poorest of the population, for 
which the minimum wage was 86.6% higher than the average income of this group in 1995, 
and the differential increased to 127.4% in 2013.8 
 
4.2.3 Impact on Inequality 
 
We have a particular interest in this paper in the possible impact of minimum wages on 
overall labour market inequalities. Belser and Rani (2011) have demonstrated the possible 
impact of minimum wages (if fully enforced) on wage inequality in India when adjusted to 
the national floor-level or to the state level minimum wages (table 9). 
 
7 Different from the Kaitz index (graph 3), because we consider all types of income (rents, pensions, cash 
transfers, etc.) and not just wages. 





                                           
Table 9: Wage Inequality (Gini coefficients) in India by Sector, 2004-05, with and 
without Minimum Wages 








Rural  0.482 0.357 0.357 
Urban 0.486 0.432 0.413 
Total 0.499 0.410 0.398 
Source: Belser and Rani (2011) 
 
 
The table shows that if the national minimum wage floor (as prevalent at the time of the study 
in 2004-05) had been fully enforced, without any fall in employment, then the Gini index of 
wage inequality would have fallen from 0.499 (observed inequality at existing wage) to 0.410. 
Further, if the state level minimum wages had been enforced, without any reduction in 
employment, then the Gini coefficient of wage inequality would have fallen to 0.398. The 
decline is steeper for rural areas, which reflects the fact that a larger proportion of workers in 
rural areas earn below minimum wages. The effect would be greatest in agriculture and low-
productivity service sectors, followed by the manufacturing sector. Thus, full enforcement of 
minimum wages would help in reducing inequalities across and within sectors.  
 
Extending this analysis to the most recent data, for 2011-12, it is interesting to note that the 
potential contribution of the minimum wage to reduction of inequality has declined between 
2004-05 and 2011-12 (table 10). At this latter date, the reduction of the overall Gini 
coefficient is only from 0.47 to 0.44. In urban areas, the decline is even smaller, from 0.50 to 
0.48. The reason for this reduction in the potential contribution of minimum wages to 
inequality lies in the changing level of average wages in relation to the minimum. Between 
2004-05 and 2011-12, average real wages rose by 64% for rural casual workers and 34% for 
urban regular workers, but the range of minimum wages rose by only 12% for minimum 
values of wages and fell by 11% for the maximum values of minimum wages. Therefore, as 
we have discussed above, and completely opposite to the situation in Brazil, the role of 
minimum wages in the labour market has been declining.  
 
Table 10 shows that a substantial increase in the minimum wage would be required to obtain 
the same impact on inequality as in 2004-05. If we assume that the minimum wages were to 
be raised, as is being demanded by the trade unions in India, by say 25%, 50%, or were to be 
doubled, then the Gini coefficient of wage inequality would decline from 0.47 for all workers 
to 0.41, 0.37 and 0.32 respectively, on the assumption of full implementation. This potential 
to decrease inequality is found for all categories of workers, but it is larger in rural than in 





Table 10: Change in Wage Inequality (Gini) with Changes in Minimum Wage Levels (if 


















 Gini coefficient of wages 
 
All 0.47 0.44 0.41 0.37 0.32 
 
Rural 0.37 0.32 0.28 0.25 0.20 
 
Urban 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.40 
Rural regular 
workers 0.47 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.33 
Rural casual 
workers 0.25 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.11 
Urban regular 
workers 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.41 
Urban casual 
workers 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.14 
Source: Computed from NSS Rounds 
 
 
These results would be modified if higher minimum wages had a significant effect on 
employment. Belser and Rani (2011) have assumed two alternative possibilities – an 
employment elasticity of -0.20 and of -0.50 – of impact on employment levels. With these 
assumptions, the study compares estimates of the Gini index of wage inequality in the two 
scenarios if the coverage is extended to those receiving wages below minimum wages. 
Results are given in table 11. 
 
Table 11: Impact of Minimum Wages on Inequality with Employment Effects, by 
Sector, India, 2004-05 
Sector Actual Wage 
Adjusting for National 





Rural 0.482 0.357 0.378 0.410 
Urban 0.486 0.432 0.443 0.459 
All 0.499 0.410 0.426 0.450 
Source: Belser and Rani (2011), computed from NSSO rounds, 2004-05 
 
 
Their study reveals that in the presence of adverse employment effects, the ability of the 
minimum wages to compress the wage distribution is reduced. However, despite these 
adverse effects, the level of inequality (if minimum wage were fully enforced) remains lower, 
especially for rural areas, than the existing level of wage inequality in the labour market. It 
should be noted that an elasticity of -0.5 is very high, much higher than any plausible 
estimates. So this calculation implies that a minimum wage will continue to reduce inequality 
event under extreme assumptions about employment effects. 
  
We replicate this calculation for Brazil in 2013 using Belser and Rani’s (2011) method (table 
12). The Gini coefficient for the wage distribution in Brazil is 0.40 and, if all salaried workers 
who earn less than the minimum wage immediately start earning exactly that amount, the Gini 
would fall to 0.37. Moreover, the impact is significantly higher among those wage earners 




other hand, the small variation of the Gini coefficient for registered wage earners does not 
lead to the conclusion that the minimum wage has a negligible effect on wage inequality in 
the formal labour market but, rather, that there is actually a relatively small proportion of this 
category of workers who earn less than the minimum wage. As a result, in this case, the 
simulated Gini remains almost unchanged. 
 
Table 12: Simulation of the Effects of the Minimum Wage on the Gini Coefficient for 
Wages by Area and Employment Status, Brazil, 2013 









Brazil 0.40 0.37 0.39 0.40 
     
Rural 0.34 0.22 0.26 0.33 
Urban 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.40 
     
Registered wage earner 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Non-registered wage earner 0.45 0.34 0.38 0.45 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on 2013 PNAD microdata. 
 
 
As in the case of India, calculations have also been replicated to allow for employment 
effects. In the case of a -0.2 employment elasticity with respect to wages, we notice a smaller 
reduction in the Gini coefficient in comparison with the simulation that disregards the effect 
on employment, although with still a significant impact for rural and non-registered workers. 
With the elasticity of -0.5 the income distribution effects basically disappear. However, as 
noted above, this is not a plausible assumption for the elasticity. Indeed, in recent years the 
relationship between the minimum wage and employment creation has been positive. So in 
the case of Brazil as well, we find that the minimum wage can make a significant contribution 
to reducing labour market inequality. 
 
Lemos (2007) found that minimum wages strongly compressed wage distributions in both 
formal and informal sectors. The compression effect was more at the bottom of the wage 
distribution in the formal sector, while it was toward the centre of the informal sector 
distribution. Consequently, minimum wages did not really benefit the lowest paid workers in 
the informal sector. This finding probably has to do with the changing role of this segment of 
the Brazilian labour market, which underwent a shrinking in relative terms. While some of 
these workers are still very low-paid, other have moved up in the wage scale even though not 
having the all labour rights secured by the Brazilian law. Thus, enforcement of minimum 
wages alone is not sufficient for improving the incomes of the worse-off. 
 
By comparing the two countries countries, it is worth acknowledging that an active minimum 
wage policy – even with an employment elasticity of -0.2 – has the potential to bring more 
results in India, even in the urban sector, and especially for casual workers, than in Brazil, 
because in the latter case the current policy has already brought down wage inequality. In 
rural areas, in both countries, a trend towards lower inequality can be forecast with an 
increase in the minimum wages. In the case of India, this would call for a reduction of the 
difference between rural and urban minimum wages. However, it may not suffice if 





Finally, we should add a positive additional point regarding the relation between the 
minimum wage and the total wage share in value added. The policy of minimum wage 
increases introduced in Brazil was important to stabilize the share of labour income as a 
proportion of GDP after 2005; it had been falling since the early 1990s (Graph 13). This result 
suggests that the decline in the concentration of labour income in the 2000s can be related to a 
slight recovery of the share of labour in the functional distribution. Among others, Considera 
and Pessoa (2013) showed two findings in this regard. The first is that the higher the 
proportion of labour income to total household income, the lower the Gini coefficient. The 
second finding is that the closer the value of the minimum wage is to the average wage paid 
by firms, the better is income distribution in the country. For the moment, available data do 
not permit a parallel estimation for India, though the decline of the labour share in India may 
well be connected with the rather modest rise in the minimum wage since the 1990s. 
  
Graph 13: Share of Labour Income in GDP (%) and Real Minimum Wage. Moving 
average for one year, Brazil, 1992 to 2013 
 
Source: IBGE/SCN 2000 quarterly data and IBGE/PME 
 
 
5. The Implementation of a Minimum Wage Policy: Some Challenges 
 
It is clear from the above that the minimum wage can play a redistributive role so long as it is 
backed by measures to ensure compliance. Without effective implementation, minimum 
wages will fail to act as a key labour market instrument. Non-compliance is an important 
problem for both countries, but is a greater problem in India than in Brazil. Thus, one of the 
most important recommendations for minimum wages is to ensure that there is a coherent 
enforcement strategy based on provision of information, effective labour inspection and 
sanctions in case of violations.  
 
The complexity of the minimum wage system in India makes it difficult to implement, 
monitor and administer; this is one of the reasons why the Act suffers from ineffective 
implementation and non-compliance. The specification of multiple rates of minimum wages 
also makes it easier for employers to avoid compliance; indeed, the wide variety of 




system of minimum wages in order to make it easier to understand and apply. Various 
proposals to this effect have been made in the past, and the national floor wage was a step 
forward, but it is not binding. The minimum wage has not been a political priority in recent 
years and change has to overcome both vested interests and bureaucratic inertia. In contrast, 
the Brazilian case demonstrates that if there is strong political backing and union support, a 
minimum wage policy can be implemented and result in increases in wages while ensuring a 
stable rate of compliance. 
 
Minimum wage policy can help reduce poverty and inequality by firstly ensuring that all 
wage workers are covered, as is the case in Brazil which provides 100% legal coverage; and 
secondly by ensuring that all legally covered wage workers are actually paid the minimum 
wages. In this regard, in India it has long been advocated to make the state-level minimum 
wage binding for all wage workers irrespective of whether they are included in the Schedules 
of the Act.  
 
In addition, it is necessary to ensure that minimum wages are set at a level sufficient for 
meeting the basic living costs of workers and their families. Of course, in both countries this 
is a political issue as much as an economic one, reflecting electoral considerations and 
payoffs to particular constituencies. Real living standards rarely figure in the discussion in 
India except in a rhetorical sense. In Brazil, there is a continuing debate with regard to the 
formula of indexation used for fixing minimum wages, which may appear technical but is in 
reality political. Even though the formula – which pegs the minimum wage to inflation and 
economic growth – was recently extended until 2019, there is an increasing consensus among 
business elites and some government sectors that this is a burden for an economy coming to 
grips with the fiscal adjustment and seeking to increase competitiveness. But this is only part 
of the story, for the minimum wage has to balance the needs of workers with broader macro-
economic context. It is critical that there be a wide political debate about minimum wage 
setting rules, involving a variety of social actors, which links the wage to the economic cycle, 
so that minimum wages rise to distribute the benefits of high growth, while maintaining living 
standards without aggravating unemployment in recessionary situations. 
 
On another front, it has been widely noted that in India in particular, both employers and 
workers lack sufficient knowledge with regard to the existence, provisions and sanctions of 
the Minimum Wages Act. In this regard, the presence of strong trade unions has been 
instrumental in implementing minimum wage policies in Brazil; this is one of the key 
challenges faced by unions in India, which have witnessed a decline in their influence. There 
is a need for trade unions in India to build greater collective strength and to reach out to the 
marginalized workers who form the bulk of the Indian workforce and are commonly paid sub-
minimal wages. However, the case of Brazil shows that an active minimum wage policy can 
also increase the wage of workers in non-unionized sectors, and may lead to new patterns of 
unionization.  
 
If minimum wages are to be effective, the government has to play an active role in the labour 
market. The Brazilian government has made conscious efforts to promote compliance and 
invested in strengthening the enforcement machinery. There is no technical reason why the 
Indian government could not similarly – perhaps by other means - play a much more active 
role in promoting enforcement and ensuring adequate levels of inspection by the Labour 





It is also important to take advantage of complementarities between minimum wages and 
other policy interventions. In this regard, the adoption the MGNREGA (Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) has had a positive impact on the implementation 
of minimum wages in India. The wages paid for employment under the MGNREGA, which 
were initially linked to the state-level minimum wages and later to the national minimum 
wage floor, were in principle uniform for all workers without any gender discrimination, and 
a variety of studies have shown that there was a fairly high degree of compliance due to 
factors such as transparency and social audits which were required under the Act. So an 
employment creation scheme, which specifically targets the lower end of the income 
distribution, helps to fix a reserve price for labour in the market below which wages could not 
be pushed down on account of excess supply, and so generates mutual reinforcement with 
minimum wage policy. Some scholars, such as Murgai and Ravallion (2005), argue that the 
government should act as an “employer of last resort” and provide employment to the excess 
supply of unskilled labour, through schemes such as the MGNREGA and others, in order to 
prevent the supply of labour at wages below the minimum levels – in other words, they would 
see such schemes as the means by which minimum wage policy can be made effective. But 
this strategy also has its own limitations, as employment programmes only specific areas and 
segments of the workforce receiving wages below the minimum. 
 
Overall, then, in India the issue is how to formulate and enforce a simple, universal and active 
minimum wage policy in a fast growing but segmented economy, with large numbers of 
unprotected, informal workers; in Brazil, where this challenge has in some degree been 
successfully met, the issue today is sustainability: how to preserve and renew minimum wage 
policy in a new, much less favourable economic context, especially taking into account the 
weak performance in terms of rising productivity levels in the past decade, so that it can 
continue to help reduce inequality. 
 
 
6. Summing Up 
 
In Brazil, the minimum wage not only protects the incomes of wage workers, especially but 
not only formal workers, but also constitutes a reference point for official pensions and other 
Social Security benefits, with a direct impact on public accounts and on aggregate demand. In 
India minimum wages have a much more limited impact because they are not set at the 
national level, but regionally and locally, cover only a small section of workers and generally 
do not influence other payments. The majority of workers, especially casual workers, remain 
outside the purview of this policy. This is not just a question of wages. The majority of wage 
workers in India have no access to social security benefits and other protections, and 
minimum wages need to be seen as one element among others in the building of a fair and 
inclusionary institutional framework for the labour market.  
 
In Brazil, the minimum wage has in the last 20 years acted as an instrument for labour market 
convergence and contributed to the reduction of wage disparities; it has also played an 
important role by reducing household income inequalities in the 2000s, as labour income, 
especially in the segments at the bottom of wage distribution – although it varies across 
sectors, regions and social groups – is indexed on the minimum wage. The steady rise of the 
minimum wage also led to a reduction of wage disparities between men and women, whites 
and blacks, rich and poor regions and highly and less skilled workers, as the latter tend to earn 






In India, this role is limited because of the multiple rates of minimum wages that differ across 
different groups of workers, and across regions and different industries. The absence of any 
definite criterion for fixing wages and poor levels of enforcement and inspection have 
rendered minimum wages ineffective as an instrument for promoting equality in the labour 
market. 
 
The minimum wage in Brazil has a positive impact on poverty reduction and wage 
equalization, in an environment of labour market growth, though it may have a small negative 
impact on employment of women and young people. In India, minimum wages, if enforced, 
would have a positive impact on poverty reduction; any impact on employment levels would 
probably be limited to some reduction in the number of days of work for casual workers, and 
increased work sharing in self-employment. However, in both countries any negative effects 
on employment would be more than offset by the constructive role played by the minimum 
wage in an overall strategy for inclusive growth. 
 
In Brazil compliance with the minimum wage law is the responsibility of labour inspectors 
from the Ministry of Labour with support from trade unions. In addition, the Labour Courts 
punish employers who do not comply with labour laws if there is a denunciation. In India, the 
institutional structure is different and there are few instruments for the enforcement of a 
minimum wage policy. Although India too has a system for legal sanctions for non-
compliance and legal provisions for making claims for non-payment of minimum wages, 
judicial proceedings have proven to be lengthy and only a small proportion of such cases have 
resulted in imposition of fines or payment of underpaid wages. The lack of political will and 
decline in the bargaining potential of unions make it difficult to reverse this situation.  
 
Thus, the biggest challenge is to find the right combination of policies, which would be 
effective in ensuring a higher degree of compliance and greater role for minimum wages as a 
tool for wage redistribution in the specific national setting. However, minimum wage policies 
do not stand on their own. They can only be effectively applied within a broader growth 
regime, in which there is coherence and continuity in public policies sustained by institutions 
oriented to growth, distribution and social inclusion. 
 
In this respect, one should bear in mind that the large increase of minimum wages in Brazil 
was brought about in a context of growing aggregate demand and high levels of job creation – 
complemented by the demand effect of this rise and of collective bargaining for workers 
getting above the minimum wage. This economic environment, in which the internal market 
was growing, led to a rise of consumption and investment at least up to 2010. The 
productivity/wage gap accumulated in the years 1990 also contributed to the effectiveness of 
the policy. 
 
The crisis of the growth regime in Brazil – after 2012 – which now is assuming new contours, 
due to the country’s economic stagnation, will show how the minimum wage policy can work 
in the downturn. It will probably help low skill formal workers to avoid losing purchasing 
power due to inflation, but will prove incapable of countering informalization and higher 
unemployment. If a new economic cycle comes in the near future, probably at meagre rates of 
growth, the maintenance of the minimum wage formula – which still can be changed 
depending on the political coalition - will not be sufficient to assure inequality reduction. 
Higher productivity levels with rising investment would be key to assure a new growth 




expansion of social policies and the building up of a more coherent employment public 
services. 
 
In India too, minimum wage policy has to be integrated into a growth regime aimed at social 
inclusion and income distribution, which would include a wider set of social policies aimed at 
poverty reduction, education and health programmes and income transfers. The Indian 
economy has recovered from the crisis better than the Brazilian, but the future shape of 
growth is uncertain, after the change of government in 2014 and the hesitant recovery of the 
global economy. A series of labour market reforms is in preparation, but it is expected that 
this will aim at greater flexibility rather than greater equality.  Nevertheless, the recent rise in 
real wages, which has been much greater than the rise in the minimum wage, has opened up 
an important space for establishing a universal wage floor as part of a broader social strategy, 
because now only a minority of workers receive wages below the current minimum. Women, 
and deprived social groups such as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, are 
overrepresented in this minority, so an effective minimum wage policy would also contribute 
to goals of gender equality and social inclusion. But for that to happen there first needs to be a 
debate on the appropriate level of the minimum wage, on how it can be internalized by all 
social actors, and – as in Brazil – on the design of complementary measures to raise 
productivity levels, especially in the unorganized sector. Policy discussions in India have 
focused on setting poverty lines; this clearly needs to be complemented by, and integrated 
with a debate on the functioning of labour markets and the role that a minimum wage can play 





Annex: The relationship between the minimum wage and the poverty line in 
India in 2011-12 
 
The national floor minimum wage in 2011-12 was set at Rs 115 per day. It has since been 
raised but poverty estimates are currently based on the 2011-12 National Sample Survey, so 
Rs 115 is the correct reference point. 
 
In the official statistics from the National Labour Bureau the monthly minimum wage is 
treated as equivalent to 26 times the daily wage, so a daily wage of Rs. 115 would amount to 
Rs. 2,990 per month.  
 
How realistic is that as an employment level for daily paid casual workers? The National 
Sample Survey for 2011-12 gives an average of 5.41 days worked per week for casual 
workers in rural areas, and 5.71 in urban areas. Taken over the year as a whole, this is a little 
over 23 days a week in rural areas, and a little under 25 in urban. However, in 2004-05 
employment levels were much lower – 19.5 days per month in rural areas and 22.7 in urban. 
All of these figures are lower than the official 26 days per month. 
 
Since the minimum wage is a floor, we should connect it to a floor for employment. In view 
of the above figures, we could make the case that casual workers should reasonably hope to 
obtain an average of 20 days work per month over the year as a whole. Casual workers are in 
theory entitled to one day’s payment without work per week, but in reality they are not 
normally remunerated for days they do not work. An allowance should also be made for 
festivals, periods of sickness (also unremunerated), gaps between jobs, travel for migrant 
workers, etc. So we can consider 240 days work per year as a reasonable measure of full 
employment. Taking this all into account, the implied monthly minimum wage amounts to Rs. 
2,300.  
 
For 2011-12, the national poverty line using the Tendulkar methodology is estimated at Rs. 
816 per capita per month in rural areas and Rs. 1,000 per capita per month in urban areas. 
 
How should we relate the individual’s wage to household income or expenditure? The 1957 
Indian Labour Conference, which established a framework for the setting of minimum wages, 
considered that “the standard working class family should be taken to comprise three 
consumption units for one earner, the earnings of women, children and adolescents being 
disregarded”. 
 
If we consider the consumption units to refer to the number of household members, then the 
equivalent Tendulkar poverty line for a three person household is Rs. 2,448 per month in rural 
areas or Rs. 3,000 in urban areas. 
 
However, the term “consumption units” suggests that children were being counted as less, 
probably 0.5 adults. It is likely that three consumption units then corresponds to two adults 
and two children. In this case, the Tendulkar poverty line is Rs. 3,264 in rural areas and Rs. 
4,000 in urban areas. 
 
Finally, we should adjust for the gender bias in the ILC estimate. We could consider a five 
member household, with one full time male earner and one half-time female earner.  The NSS 
for 2011-12 gives a slightly smaller household size (4.5 average) but the five member 




number of workers, the NSS gives an average of 1.68 workers (including primary and 
secondary workers) for the 4.5 member household. This ratio would imply 1.87 workers in a 5 
member household, which can be compared with our assumption of two workers, but only 
one working full time. We are in the right ball park, though clearly these estimates could be 
refined. 
 
For a five member household the Tendulkar poverty line is Rs. 4080 in rural areas and Rs. 
5,000 in urban areas. 
 
These different assumptions give the following table: 
 










wage (20 days) 
Rural    
3 persons, one 
earner 
2448 2990 2300 
4 persons (= 3 
consumption 
units), one earner 
3264 2990 2300 
5 persons, 1.5 
earners 
4080 4485 3450 
    
Urban    
3 persons, one 
earner 
3000 2990 2300 
4 persons (= 3 
consumption 
units), one earner 
4000 2990 2300 
5 persons, 1.5 
earners 
5000 4485 3450 
 
 
It can be seen that in only two rural cases (26 days work and a 3-person household for one 
worker; and 26 days work for 1.5 workers in a 5-person household) does the minimum wage 
give a household income above the poverty line. In urban areas all are below the poverty line. 
And all cases using a more realistic level of 20 days work per month, on average, are below 
the poverty line. 
 
Obviously there will be a great deal of variation in dependency ratios and days of work from 
one household to another. We consider that the 5 person household with 1.5 workers and an 
average of 20 days work per month is fairly typical. In this case the minimum wage gives an 
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